When comparing Southeast Asia and Western Europe, the similarities are far outweighed by the differences. Perhaps the major similarity is that, like Europe, the impetus for creating a security community in Southeast Asia lay in the region's own recent history, characterised by struggles against colonisation, territorial disputes and the battle for security and recognition on the part of the new states in the region. The second major similarity is that, as in Europe, the security community building process has eliminated war between member states. Unlike the European experience, however, ASEAN has not accomplished this by constructing a complex web of institutions but rather by building a loosely-coupled community of values, interests and norms between elites in member states.
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The second major similarity is that, as in Europe, the security community building process has eliminated war between member states. Unlike the European experience, however, ASEAN has not accomplished this by constructing a complex web of institutions but rather by building a loosely-coupled community of values, interests and norms between elites in member states.
2 It is here, though, that the similarities end and there are six key points of difference between Western Europe and Southeast Asia.
First, whereas Western Europe is a tightly-coupled security community, the Southeast Asian security community is loosely-coupled at best. Although there have been no armed conflicts between ASEAN members and there is evidence of dependable expectations of peaceful change, there is also evidence that Southeast Asian states continue to prepare for war amongst themselves and there are a number of lingering territorial disputes.
Second, although it is not novel to describe ASEAN as a 'community' 3 , it is a very different type of community to the one that exists in Western Europe. As Nischalke pointed out, 'ASEAN has constituted a rule-based community rather than a community based on the existence of a collective identity'. 4 Rather than being framed by a common stock of pre-existing ideas (such as the 'European' idea) or identities that crosses the borders of member states, ASEAN is founded on a set of common norms that are designed to manage relations between states.
The third key difference is that ASEAN comprises developing states rather than advanced industrial states (though since its formation some of its members, especially Singapore and Malaysia have developed rapidly). The norms at the heart of ASEAN were created to enable states to concentrate on internal economic development, the consolidation of the state against communist and secessionist challenges, the external legitimisation of state leaders, and the global independence of the region as a whole.
5 I will argue later that this primary concern with state consolidation and legitimisation led ASEAN members to develop norms that are almost identical to the norms that underpin pluralist international society: sovereign equality, non-use of force, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.
The fourth key difference is that, with the recent exceptions of Thailand and The Philippines, the members of ASEAN are not liberal democracies. As we noted in the introduction, several writers have linked the security community idea to the democratic peace thesis, holding that in order to qualify as a security community member states must uphold liberal democratic principles. However, as Acharya points out, limiting the security communities concept in this way would give it limited utility in regions other than Europe and North America. 6 In the case of ASEAN, the communities' values and norms are designed to protect authoritarian regimes from outside interference and hence manage their sense of insecurity.
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The fifth key difference is that the states and societies of Southeast Asia share little in the way of common histories and identities. Some ASEAN members (most notably Vietnam) endured protracted violence on their way to independence; others had a more benign transition (Malaysia, Singapore and The Philippines) and enjoy continuing close relations with their former colonial overlords, whilst others (especially Indonesia) continue to confront problems left unresolved from the colonial period (in Aceh and East Timor for instance); still others were able to preserve their independence (at least nominally) throughout the colonial era (Thailand). This has two important effects on the ASEAN community and the relationship between insiders and outsiders. On one hand, it means that the shared identities and interests at the heart of the community do not derive from shared historical experiences but from a much more recent shared experience of modern statehood. On the other hand, this lack of shared history means that there has been little consensus about what the outside threats to
